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Abstract. This research develops a model of eligible voters rationally maximizing their 
stochastic utility functions in their decisions with respect to casting ballots in elections that 
result in voting decision being largely determined by social and psychological factors 
heterogeneously maleable by political expenditures. The wealthiest agents utilize their 
overwhelming financial resources to promote only candidates cooperating with their special 
interests to attract public attention, which exerts social pressure on voters to cast ballots only 
for those politicians who represent those agents. The model, which enables exacting 
computation of the benefits to politicians, special interest groups, and voters from their 
political actions, is shown to supply insightful explanations for the 2016 U.S. Presidential 
polling results for the four leading candidates. Voters were effectively swayed by large 
political expenditures to select from the two candidates who represented the agents 
providing the financial backing to market their special interests. 
Keywords. Special interests, Voter utility, Elections, Political marketing. 
JEL. D71, D72, F50. 
 
1. Introduction 
he association between the political expenditures of special interest 
groups and voter choices at the polls has long been the subject of 
controversy.1 Theories of that relationship, such as those developed 
by Bassetti & Pavesi (2017), Bombardini & Trebbi (2011), Grossman & 
Helpman (1996, 2001), and Baron (1994), have generally been based on an 
assumption of all political participants acting to rationally maximize the 
different benefits they expect to receive from the competing candidates or 
political parties after their election. Within the context of these models, the 
campaign contributions of special interests only serve to inform voters of 
the government policies which the politicians promise to pursue and from 
which voters derive fixed utility.  
However, Brennan & Buchanan (1984) long ago indicated that voting 
decisions may be heavily influenced by factors associated with the 
consumption utility each individual derives from just making a particular 
ballot selection in a fashion analogous to rooting for a sports team. For 
instance, there is strong evidence that many voters cast ballots to express 
their political opinions (Pons & Tricaud, 2018). Such factors unrelated to the 
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election outcome, as well as the broad spectrum of voter preferences for 
government policies that is characterized by a heterogeneously wide 
diversity of convictions, may be subject to various degrees of influence 
through different political expenditures focused on influencing the 
individual aspects of the utility functions of the electorate. The influence on 
the political economy associated with manipulating voters' opinions is an 
area that has been largely neglected in the literature (Passarelli & Tabellini, 
2017). 
This research expands on existing theories of all voters, special interest 
groups, and politicians maximizing their individual benefits by integrating 
psychological and social factors into voter utility which can be manipulated 
by the political marketing funded by wealthy agents to promote their 
special interests. Voter utility functions, which are specified to be 
stochastically determined by a parsimonious number of variables, can be 
heterogeneously affected by diverse political expenditures that enable the 
financial supporters of politicians to influence government policy for their 
own benefit. The model facilitates understanding optimal strategies for 
political marketing and estimation of the polling effects of campaign 
spending, including with respect to marginal candidates who have minimal 
chances of electoral success.  
In an application of the model to the 2016 U.S. Presidential election 
using information on political expenditures, it is shown that campaign 
spending largely attracted votes to the nominees of the two major parties 
by drawing support away from fringe candidates. The model is thereby 
demonstrated to supply a more precise understanding of how special 
interest spending is able to sway voters away from political parties who 
may better reflect their first choices. It also indicates that Trump was much 
more successful in drawing support away from the third parties than 
Clinton despite her agenda being potentially more consistent with the 
interests of many of those voters. 
In Section I, a brief survey of the most relevant political research is 
provided. Section II specifies the simple model, which supplies useful 
implications for optimal voter behavior and political marketing 
expenditures. Section III applies the theory to the recent U.S. Presidential 
election campaign to illustrate insights provided by the model in 
explaining the actual polling effects of political spending for the two 
mainstream candidates as well as for two fringe contenders. A summary of 
the paper is supplied in Section IV. This research can assist in optimization 
of actions by all those participating in, or affected by, the political process, 
as well as in prediction of outcomes of elections for government offices. 
At least since Tullock's (1967) seminal paper indicating the incentives 
groups of people or businesses have to expend resources to create and 
protect special privileges or monopolistic power, political economists have 
recognized the motivation of businesses to expend resources to influence 
government policy that may not benefit the governed people in the 
aggregate (Congleton, 2018). Baron (1994) long ago developed a model of 
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how government policy is set by the interaction between the utility 
functions of voters, special interest groups, and politicians who often 
include incumbent officials. Political processes tend to coalesce around two 
major parties or candidates for strategic reasons, as shown by Dellis (2013), 
Forand & Maheshri (2015), and Peeters, Saran, & Yueksel (2016) across 
different electoral systems. Grossman & Helpman (1996) demonstrated 
theoretically that political parties, through which candidates for public 
office tend to run in elections, are motivated to maximize “a weighted sum 
of the aggregate welfare of informed voters and members of special interest 
groups”.  
Special interest groups are generally assumed to exercise their influence 
on government policy through campaign contributions to politicians that 
affect the choices of uninformed voters (Bombardini & Trebbi, 2011). 
Special interest groups seeking to have particular government policies 
implemented make campaign contributions to candidates for public office 
to sway the uninformed voters and thereby affect election results. 
Unpopular special interest groups are shown to offset any negative impact 
their preferred government policies may have on the preferences of 
informed voters with fixed views by making political campaign 
contributions to influence sufficient uninformed voters to win elections of 
pliable government leaders. More generalized theories that assume overall 
political spending can impact the choices of any voters have been 
developed by researchers such as Bassetti & Pavesi (2017) do not specify 
the components of voter utility functions which are most tractable to 
political marketing expenditures that are strategically targeted.  
Social and emotional factors have been shown to be instrumental in 
voter decisions (Altomonte, Gennaro, & Passareli, 2019), and many ballots 
have been found to be cast for a candidate even when that particular 
selection is most likely to have an impact on an election outcome unwanted 
by the voter (Pons & Tricaud, 2018). While there are disadvantages to 
protest voting in comparison to casting ballots strategically to prevent the 
election of a less preferred leading candidate (Myatt, 2015), voters 
dissatisfied with the existing system are heavily motivated by collective 
feelings and the benefits of common actions for a cause (Gaffney, et 
al.,2018). Those variables and their interactions that motivate voting 
decisions may be effectively targeted for influence through the use of 
political spending employing different marketing strategies. For instance, 
adoption of particular ideologies emphasizing the taxation costs of 
government welfare spending have been shown to significantly affect voter 
choices (Shin, 2016). 
Political campaign funding has been shown to have an effect on voter 
choices in many ways. For instance, money may be spent to assist in the 
registration and transportation to polling booths of particular sets of 
eligible voters, who are strategically selected to be more likely to view a 
promoted candidate favorably (Schickler, 2016). Huber & Arceneuaux 
(2007) have found that simple political advertisements can impact the 
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preferences of voters who are reasonably well informed in unspecified 
ways. Voter opinions about candidates' ability to deliver on promises 
relating to valence issues that are universally desired, such as economic 
prosperity and crime prevention about which there is uncertainty 
regarding the degree of success that any politicians and policies would 
bring (Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2000), may be especially maleable by 
political marketing. 
While public dissemination of politicians receiving large amounts of 
campaign contributions from wealthy special interest groups can 
negatively impact the electoral successes of those politicians (Fergusson, 
2014), much of the political spending that occurs in the U.S. is legally 
undisclosed (Dowling & Wichowsky, 2013). Many political expenditures 
are made to influence public opinion through donations to educational 
charities that serve the special interests of the donors (Wang & Qian, 2012). 
Green, McGrath, & Aronow (2013) have shown that even strongly 
entrenched views on particular issues can be changed over time through 
effective promotions which can reverse seemingly fixed opinions among 
the aggregate populace. 
This research develops a simple, generalized theory of political 
processes that specifies all voters are characterized by preferences which 
are held with heterogeneously varying degrees of conviction that can be 
influenced by different types of political expenditures focused on the most 
maleable components of their utility functions. The model, which integrates 
the influence of the political expenditures of special interest groups on 
voter utility with their ballot choices in the context of relevant social, 
psychological, and strategic considerations, enables new insights on 
campaign spending and polling outcomes, as shown by an application to 
the 2016 Presidential election campaign in the U.S. 
 
2. A model of the heterogeneous susceptibility of voter 
utility to political expenditures 
Political participants, including all voters, agents with special interests, 
and politicians are assumed to maximize the expected value of their 
individualized von Neumann-Morgenstern (1953) utility functions. In 
particular, each potential political participant j acts to maximize uj  
 
uj = E[{Ps,jUjs{Bjs - Cj}],        (1) 
 
where Ps,jis j's perception of the chance of a particular state of the world 
occurring (where the state s can be the outcome of an event such as an 
election), Ujs is j's utility value of a benefit from an event in state s 
(measured in terms of having a dollar in that state), Bjs is the expected value 
to j of all the summed gross benefits to j in state s resulting from an 
expenditure Cj to influence government policy, and E is the expected value 
operator. The values of Bjs and Cj are calculated as the equivalent present 
value of having a certain monetary unit such as a dollar in the current time 
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period when costs and/or benefits occur in the future, are uncertain, or are 
intangible.  
As opposed to be fixed, the utility value in (1) that each agent assigns to 
the value of costs and benefits measured in dollars in any state, as well as 
the probabilities of the states occurring, are allowed to be both time-
varying and changeable by external events, which include social influences 
and persuasive marketing by others. The changing nature of the factors and 
values that affect human happiness and feelings of self-contentment in 
varying degrees (Ryan & Deci, 2001) is consistent with this generalized 
form of utility functions that reflect the real world and therefore permit 
realistic modeling of political behavior and spending in the context of 
economic and political theory. 
Each agent j seeking to influence government policy will make political 
contributions cj,n to politician n that maximize the value of the net benefit 
(i.e., uj) from spending to influence the exercise of government power 
 
bj,n-cj,n>0j,         (2) 
 
where bj,n is the expected value of the gross benefit to j from a political 
expenditure cj,n for the benefit of politician n. Agents choosing to be 
candidates for public office also seek to maximize (1), and each such 
politician n will seek to maximize the expected value of the net benefit bn, j 
to n across all cj,n and j, where 
 
bn,j=cj,n+b*n,j.         (3) 
 
and b*n,j is the positive, negative, or zero expected value to n arising 
from n accepting a political contribution from j and therefore pushing the 
government policies desired by j.2 Politicians n derive utility from being 
elected and therefore benefit from political contributions cj,n to their election 
campaigns that enable them to spend more money to increase their 
electoral prospects.3 
Advocacy for government actions wanted by j may create positive 
(negative) utility to n, thereby resulting in a positive (negative) value of 
b*n,j, because the policies desired by j are, without political marketing, 
desirable (undesirable) to many voters z and therefore increase (decrease) 
the probability vn of n being elected. The positive or negative benefits bj,n of 
a political expenditure by agent j in (2) are affected by the impact which 
that cj,n has on b*n,j in (3) to influence politician n through (3).  
Each eligible voter may be considered to be a special type of agent who, 
in addition to being able to make political expenditures in money and kind 
(including via volunteer campaigning activities of all types), also has a 
direct impact on the outcome of an election through the individual's ballot 
choices. A precise modeling of voter utility can enable improved estimation 
of the variable values which determine the interaction between the various 
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political participants and thereby enable maximization of their utility 
functions in (1).  
 
2.1. Modeling voter behavior 
As shown by Grossman & Helpman (2001), the likelihood of n being 
elected is determined by voter choices at the ballot box that in turn are 
affected by the benefit perceived by each voter z from enactment of a 
particular policy pushed by n for the benefit of j. The benefits or 
disadvantages of any policies to each eligible voter z are often not totally 
clear due to their complex effects on matters of concern to z that can be 
impacted by the enactment of other policies and perceptions about the 
politician(s) carrying them out. In particular, many policies proposed by 
candidates for political office relate to “valence issues” like economic 
prosperity about which the ability of politicians to achieve outcomes 
desired by the voting public are uncertain (Ansolabehere & Snyder, 2000). 
The utility Uzs,n to voter z in a state s,n where z casts a ballot for a particular 
politician n can therefore be affected by qualitative variables which 
influence voter perceptions about which candidates are most likely able to 
deliver benefits from carrying out their proposed policies. The perceived 
probability of any particular politician winning an election also impacts the 
likelihood of a voter obtaining a benefit from a balloting outcome (Bouton, 
Castanheira, & Saguer, 2017). 
In addition, voters' utilities are a function of social and psychological 
factors which are unrelated to the advantages or disadvantages z obtains as 
a result of an individual ballot choice in influencing the actual election 
outcome (Brennan & Buchanan, 1984). For example, each voter z may 
derive satisfaction derived from voting for a candidate n whom z perceives 
to be the best candidate based on policy proposals and ideology, as well as 
based on personal characteristics, irregardless of that politician's chance of 
winning the election and the strategic impact such a vote may have on the 
election outcome  (Pons & Tricaud, 2018).  
Social benefits may also be derived from voting, such as may stem from 
acting in concert with others in a voter's social network (Spinney, 2017), 
including with respect to engaging in protests against leading contenders 
(Gaffney, et al., 2018). The emotional utility derived by an individual from 
casting a ballot for a particular candidate is magnified when acting as part 
of a community-wide movement (Altomonte, Gennaro, & Passareli, 2019). 
Becker, Tausch, & Wagner (2011) have shown that people increase their 
self-esteem, pride, and happiness by merely participating in a collective 
action to express a political opinion. Such impacts on voter utility, along 
with those relating to actual election outcomes, may be affected by political 
marketing expenditures cj,n that can influence z's perceived total utility from 
casting a ballot for a particular marketed candidate. 
The expected value of the utility uz,n to each eligible voter z from voting 
for any politician n can be broken up into two main components consisting 
of a factor unrelated to the election impact of a single ballot selection and a 
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variable which is a function of n's chance of z's vote affecting an election 
outcome. The former factor relates to any social or psychological benefits 
from merely casting a ballot for a political candidate that Shayo & Harel 
(2012) have indicated may relate to the utility derived from expressing a 
preference, exercising a moral duty, and maintaining a self-image. The 
latter variable includes not only the benefits to z arising from the election of 
a politician with more desirable policy proposals but also from a reduction 
in the probability of a less desired politician being elected instead.   
In particular, the utility uz,n to z from voting for any n is 
 
uz,n  = u*z,n + w[vnb*z,n-vnb*z,x],       (4) 
 
where u*z,n is the expected value of the utility a voter z derives merely 
from casting a vote for a particular candidate n for social and psychological 
reasons unrelated to the impact that single vote has on the actual polling 
result, w is the probability perceived by a voter that a single ballot will 
determine the electoral outcome, b*z,n denotes the benefits provided to voter 
z from candidate n winning at the polls, and x is the politician whose vnb*z,x 
is the lowest of all candidates for whom z can instead vote. Each z 
maximizes utility across all politicians n in (4) to vote for the politician n=N 
who provides the highest expected utility to z that involves comparing z's 
utility measured across a set of separate computations for each candidate. 
In contrast to models which attempt to artificially categorize voters into a 
small number of fixed types (Kawai & Watanabe, 2013), this equation 
allows for a complete continuum of voter utility functions which may be 
manipulated with varying degrees and types of political marketing 
expenditures. 
In (4), wvnb*z,n represents the benefit to z derived from the impact a vote 
for politician n has on increasing the chance of n being elected, while 
wvnb*z,x measures the effect of a vote for n in reducing the probability of a 
less desired politician x being the electoral victor. The latter variable can 
motivate strategic voting in non-binomial elections, insofar as a candidate 
may be selected over another more desirable one to reduce the probability 
of a less desirable third candidate winning at the ballot box.5 The natural 
inclination of people faced with complex choices that supply limited 
benefits and hence don't justify complex rational analysis to make decisions 
to use efficient subconscious algorithms focused most easily on two choices 
(Gigrenzer, 2007) would tend to motivate most voters to solve (4) by 
concentrating their analysis on only the two candidates with the greatest 
chances of being elected in pluralities like the U.S.  
Any eligible voter z will only cast a ballot for a candidate if, for some 
politician n, 
 
uz,n> Cz,         (5) 
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where Cz includes the costs to voter z associated with registering and 
going to the polls, and uz,n denotes the expected value of the utility to voter 
z from casting a ballot for candidate n with the largest uz,n. In inequality (5), 
which is based on the economic theory originally developed by Downs 
(1957), the cost Cz includes transportation expenses needed to register to 
vote and cast a ballot as well as the opportunity costs associated with doing 
so that incorporate time lost from employment and/or personal activities in 
freely disposable time.4 The transportation and time expenses associated 
with voting can represent a higher cost for those with lower income (such 
as due to an inability to leave work on election day and lack of personal 
transportation), especially as a percentage of available time and money. As 
a result, eligible voters who are relatively poorer people may be less likely 
to cast ballots if it is more costly to register and vote as is affected by 
government laws that impose greater burdens on eligible voters and thus 
inhibit voter turnout, especially among poorer members of society, through 
increasing Cz in (5). 
The costs Cz also include the time and expense related to obtaining and 
analyzing information on the candidates that can be significant for 
uninformed and less informed voters. The latter costs may be especially 
large when there is less media coverage and other campaigning for some 
candidates and political parties, as is typical in many elections for local 
government offices and for candidates n backed by little or no political 
expenditures. The very act of voting therefore becomes a luxury item 
imposing the costs of becoming informed. As a result, there tends to be 
greater participation in voting by those with the resources, education, and 
time to expend on becoming informed and casting a well-reasoned ballot 
(Economist, 2017b). 
Since each eligible voter will only cast a ballot if the boundary condition 
in (5) holds, politicians n and the agents j they serve will be interested in Cz 
as well as uz,n. Some political marketing by n may therefore be directed 
toward lowering Cz for sets of voters whose uz,n is believed to be the highest 
for candidate n. For instance, resources are often expended in voter 
registration drives and free transportation to the polls for eligible voters as 
well as through promotions of candidates biased to provide information 
likely to positively impact the decisions of such people who are not totally 
informed or convinced. Because eligible voters z tend to be part of a group 
of people who may perceive a civic duty to vote (Feddersen & Sandroni, 
2006), some marketing expenditures may also be directed at raising the u*z,n 
associated with the act of casting a ballot among the likely eligible voters 
for a candidate in order to increase the chances of (5) them acting going to 
the polls.   
Most voters have common interests in terms of national economic 
prosperity and security, and so their du*z,n is impacted by perceptions 
about the personal characteristics of candidates, such as relating to 
competence, integrity, and dedication to the common good. Many such 
characteristics of the politician as a person are ones with which voters 
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identify in terms of their own individual moral preferences, and so 
campaign spending to enhance the personal image of a candidate can be 
effective in impacting the social and psychological gains voters derive from 
voting that are incorporated into u*z,n. 
The relative values of uz,n across all z and n in (4) determine both the 
decision to vote in (5) as well as any choice actually made at the ballot box. 
These decisions across the entire set of eligible voters then aggregate to 
establish the probability vn of any politician n being elected and thus the 
crucial value of b*n,j in (3) that interacts with uz,n in (4) and bj,n in (2) to 
determine the optimal cj,n.  
 
2.2. Interactive effects of political spending on the utility of 
political participants 
Because each uz,n is impacted by the sum of all cj,n to the extent that a 
voter can be influenced by political expenditures, the policies desired by 
agents j that politicians choose to support are therefore determined by the 
interactions between (2-4). In particular, (3) and (4) are strongly influenced 
by the probability vn of a politician winning an election that is determined 
by the uz,n of all the voters, whose utility and choices at the polls are in turn 
impacted by the cj,n across all j. With all voters' uz,n impacting vn and hence 
b*n,j that determines the optimal cj,n in the maximization of (2), uz,n and cj,n 
affect each other in an interrelated fashion. 
Defining a variable's first derivative with respect to changes in cj,n, and 
denoting Sn as the state s in an election where the politician n preferred by j 
wins, it follows from (1) that 
 
dbj,n = dvnBjSn,         (6) 
 
where dvn is the change in the probability of candidate n winning an 
election as a a result of an increase in campaign spending cj,n, and BjSn is the 
benefit provided to j by the election of politician n. This equation indicates 
that political spending by j should increase up to the point where 
BjSn=1/dvn. This result implies that the inverse of the cost to influence a vote 
divided by the number of voters affects the benefit to agents donating to 
political campaigns. Assuming Bombardini & Trebbi's (2011) empirical 
estimate of $145 to buy a vote implies dvn=1/145 divided by the number of 
voters, and so the benefit to agents donating to political campaigns would 
therefore be the inverse of that figure times the gains to j derived from n 
winning the election. 
The benefit to any politician n from a change in the political 
expenditures for n equals 
 
dbn,j= dvnBnSn.         (7) 
 
If the spending for n is independent of n's policy proposals, as in the 
case of campaign donations to n by an agent j whose interests n has already 
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agreed to represent, bn,j is the expected value of the utility to n because n's 
proposals and b*n,j, are unaffected by the political expenditure in this 
situation. More campaign contributions would always be accepted from j in 
such a case because dvnBnSn>0 where politician n fully represents agent j's 
interest regardless of the amount of money donated. 
On the other hand, dvm can be negative for politicians m with optimal 
positions that do not exactly coincide with those of an agent j whose own 
preferred policies would have an adverse impact on the value of b*z,m, and 
hence on b*m,j if m represents j's interests. In this case, a politician m would 
accept a donation from such an agent j only if the campaign contribution 
cj,m from j to m has an effect that exceeds the negative impact on vm 
associated with m pushing any particular policy of that agent. The 
minimum size of a donation by j to buy a more desired policy proposal 
from m must therefore at least equal the cost to buy a vote times the 
number of votes lost as a result of adopting j's more desired policy. An 
agent might expend more than this amount up to the point where 
Bj,Sn>1/dvm, which is determined by duz,n. 
Equation (4) indicates that the impact of changes in cj,n on voter utility is 
 
duz,n  = w[vn{db*z,n-db*z,x}  +  dvn{b*z,n-b*z,x}] + du*z,n.    (8) 
 
With a single vote almost never deciding an election outcome with a 
sizeable electorate, voters might rationally believe w is infinitesimally 
small, thus making the term [vn{db*z,n-db*z,x}+dvn{b*z,n-b*z,x}] 
inconsequential in comparison to du*z,n in (8). For instance, even if political 
spending caused z to perceive receiving $1 million more benefits from n's 
election victory (i.e., from db*z,n), an objectively estimated impact on voter 
utility would be no greater than $0.01 if there were a hundred million 
voters. Such a trivial effect may not contribute much to even motivating an 
eligible voter to go to the polls, as it covers no more than 0.01% of a Cz=$10 
in (5) that might minimally exist for most people in the form of 
transportation expenses and opportunity costs of time associated with 
casting a ballot.6  
Because du*z,n is the primary determinant of duz,n, the impact of political 
expenditures on actual candidate policy proposals may be may be minimal 
in the absence of psychological influences or social pressures. Political 
marketing focused on particular issues or ideology can actually be 
counterproductive in changing voters' entrenched views about some 
particular policies (LeConte, 2018), as may also promotion of candidates' 
competence in governing that can create an image of an elitist lack of 
concern for the plight of common people (Di Tella & Rotenberg, 2018). 
Campaign expenditures cj,n may therefore optimally focus on affecting the 
psychological and social factors which impact voter utility in order to 
maximize the impact on uz,n and thereby win more votes, thus raising vn, 
that increases both bn,j and bj,n.  
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The social environment of voters has been established to have an 
especially important impact on both ballot choices and active political 
campaign participation (Pietryka & DeBats, 2017) as well as on the decision 
to vote at all (Gerber, Green, & Larmer, 2008). In particular, social pressure 
among those with whom voters have direct or indirect relationships and 
with whom they identify significantly affects behavior in elections as does 
the groups of people with whom a person identifies (Spinney, 2017), and so 
polling results may be most efficiently impacted through political 
expenditures targeted at influencing that component of u*z,n. Organized 
dissemination of information about the common interests of particular 
categorizations of people (such as individuals with the same ethnicity, 
religion, social/economic class, etc.) has been shown to increase the 
participation of members of the identity groups in political actions by 
communicating a collective position on a particular government policy 
(Klandermans, 2014). 
Marketing campaigns for candidates n are therefore often focused on 
identity politics or promotions of the particular candidate characteristics 
and policy advocacy which matter to various ethnic, religious, social-
economic class, and other groupings of people, who pressure (and are 
pressured by) others in their ballot choices. Political marketing for 
candidates n accepting campaign donations from wealthy agents j pushing 
policies that are unpopular with the aggregate population (i.e., have a 
negative b*n,j and hence b*z,n below zero) can utilize this phenomenon to 
affect election results by emphasizing policies that are targeted to issues 
that are irrelevant to j but popular among particular segments of the 
population. Such political spending thereby raises voters' u*z,n (and thus 
their uz,n that increases vn) through the social gains derived from casting 
ballots as part of the segment of people with whom voters best identify.  
One of the most important factors affecting voter utility is the negative 
impact relating to a sense of betrayal by politicians due to perceptions of 
corruption or self-dealing (Di Tella & Rotenberg, 2018) that can be related 
to expectations that candidates, if elected, will focus on serving their 
cronies and wealthy political donors. The tendency of people to be more 
likely to participate in political actions when they are part of larger groups 
with common interests that include collective superordinate ones of the 
nation as a whole (Klandermans, 2014) can be exploited by political 
marketing appealing to patriotic sentiments and the common interests of 
any majority groups (such as Caucasians in the U.S. and Europe) as well as 
by promotion of an image of a politician as representing the people as a 
whole against some elite group.  
Wealthy agents seeking to maximize the monetary return on their 
political investments may optimally capitalize on the typical social and 
psychological tendencies of voters by supporting candidates who focus on 
non-economic policy positions which cater to different segments of the 
population by providing clear choices on non-economic issues which are of 
no relevance to the financial interests of the agents supplying the most 
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political capital. By backing only two different politicians who concentrate 
on opposing views of great importance among different social groups (such 
as with respect to abortion and civil rights) and hence have a material 
impact on the u*z,n component of voter utility, voter attention is diverted 
away from the issues that affect the economic interests of those with the 
most money. The general psychological tendency to make decisions from 
two leading choices might thereby raise the share of the votes received by 
the two main candidates supported by those with the most money, 
especially when rising political expenditures for the politicians backed by 
the greatest financial resources increase public attention on them and move 
them into foreground in the polls. In addition, with voters being highly 
influenced by perceptions about how their ballot choices might best benefit 
their social or identity groups and the common good in the aggregate, 
du*z,n is a function of [vn{db*z,n-db*z,x}+dvn{b*z,n-b*z,x}] irregardless of the size 
of w. In particular, there is social pressure “not to waste” a vote by casting 
a ballot for z's most desired candidate who, however, has few chances of 
winning the election.7 
Voter concentration on only the candidates backed by the agents with 
the most political capital to spend is facilitated through political parties 
create brand names for their candidates that coalesce people's preferences 
into separate national groupings which create a higher vn with greater 
political expenditures, thereby increasing voter utility through ballots cast 
for their nominees for public office. Much of the branding effect of political 
parties on u*z,n is created in prior election cycles which have focused 
strategic campaign spending on the Democratic and Republican Parties in 
the U.S. and therefore won the most votes in that country in the past. Most 
campaign donations are therefore motivated to continue to be directed to 
the candidates of those two parties in order to maximize b*n,j in (3) and 
thereby minimize the needed cj,n for agent j to get politician n to implement 
the policies j desires. The higher vn for the candidates of those two parties 
that results also motivates more media coverage of them, thereby 
expanding public discussion of those politicians and further increasing the 
social utility incorporated into voters' u*z,n. 
The model develop in this research thus indicates that the expected 
utility uz,n of voters z from casting a ballot for candidate n can be influenced 
purchased through political marketing expenditures which are sufficiently 
high to affect their voting choices (and hence election outcomes) 
independently of the government policies sought by agents j investing the 
most capital into the political process. The political marketing expenditures 
of j essentially change voters' utility value UzS in (1) derived from casting 
ballots for the candidate(s) n funded by j to obtain benefits BjS from being 
able to successfully have n elected and thereby influence the exercise of 
government power. The simple theory here can be usefully applied to 
explain seemingly complex actual political phenomena, as indicated in the 
next Section.  
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3. Insights derived from value estimate of the model 
variables in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election 
  Public data on the political expenditures and election results in the 2016 
U.S. Presidential campaign may be utilized to illustrate insights obtainable 
through the theory that can help explain the results of the most recent U.S. 
Presidential election campaign. In this analysis, the values of some 
variables are estimated using various justifiable assumptions. In particular, 
public polling data indicating an average $145 in campaign spending to 
obtain another vote (Bombardini & Trebbi, 2011) is employed to determine 
the polling impact of political expenditures. In addition, it is assumed that 
the utility of a voter at the margin of choosing between two candidates (i.e. 
equally favoring both approximately) is reflective of the relative cross-
sectional polls, including with respect to favorablility ratings for a 
politician. The latter assumption, which is valid with the incremental cross-
sectional differences in utility across eligible voters for each candidate that 
are assumed here (as is effectively indicative of a uniform distribution for 
uz,nthat therefore varies from the average by a similar amount across the 
entire population of voters), then implies that bn, and bj,n equal  the polling 
percentages BnSn and BjSn, respectively. 
 
3.1. Spending impacts on the polling results for the leading two 
candidates 
In the final 2016 Presidential election in the U.S., Clinton received, 
2,868,891 more votes than Trump did across the country, at 65,845,063 vs. 
62,984,825 out of a total of 136 million ballots cast (270ToWin, 
2016a).Clinton had higher campaign spending than Trump at $794,875,608 
vs. $408,496,207 (OpenSecrets.org, 2016) that should have had resulted in 
her winning by only {$794,875,608-$408,496,207}/$145=2,655,913 more votes 
if she had been as equally unpopular as Trump without such greater 
expenditures for her.8 This result indicates that the median uz,n would have 
been greater for Clinton than for Trump even without more money being 
expended for Clinton, thus implying a lower b*n,j for Trump. Nevertheless, 
even prior to the impact of the differential spending for the two main 
candidates, Clinton's b*n,j was higher than for Trump that can be measured 
in dollar value or cost as {2,868,891-2,655,913}x$145=$30,881,810.  
Polls in the week before the election indicated 54.4% of American voters 
had an unfavorable opinion of Clinton versus 57.0% against Trump 
(270ToWin, 2017b). This surveyed difference implies a the average voter 
had a higher uz,n of -4.4%-(-7.0%)=2.6% for Clinton in November 2016. This 
difference would indicate that she should have won by {0.026}{136 million 
voters}=3.536 million votes instead of only the 2.868 million more votes 
Clinton won in the actual election. One cause for the deviation between the 
3.536-2.868=0.668 million in votes implied by the pre-election survey 
compared to the actual official totals could relate to eligible voters 
preferring Clinton to Trump but not casting ballots because their utility in 
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(4) did not exceed the boundary condition of covering the costs of voting in 
(5). For instance, although Clinton's proposed policies offered slightly more 
direct benefits to the average voter than did Trump, both of those two 
mainstream candidates promised policies friendly to businesses that may 
have been widely perceived to be insufficiently different to many eligible 
voters to justify the cost of bothering to cast a ballot. This factor appears to 
have cost Clinton 0.668/136 million=0.5% of the actual November 2016 
totals, as may imply Clinton could have improved her results by that 
margin simply with more campaign spending focused on “getting out the 
vote”. 
The $385,107,401/$145=2.66 million votes purchased by Clinton's higher 
campaign spending indicates 2.66/136 million=1.9% of the total nationwide 
vote was actually bought by the greater political expenditures for Clinton 
in 2016. This result implies that the relative uz,n for the average voter z with 
respect to her was -4.4%+1.9%=-6.3% without the differential expenditures. 
Here, it is being assumed that political spending of equal amounts for 
Trump and Clinton were totally offsetting between those two candidates 
(including with respect to how unfavorable they were viewed), as both 
campaigns utilized positive promotions of their candidates as well as 
negative advertising of their main opponent.  
The assumption that $145 in political spending influences a vote implies 
that a million dollars of expenditures increased vn for a selected political 
recipient with 136 million ballots cast in the 2016 U.S. election 
by1/145x136=1/19,720=0.00507%. This result indicates from (6) that the 
benefit Bj,Sn to a $1 million campaign contributor from the election of the 
preferred candidate n must have been at least $1,000,000/.0000507=$19.720 
billion, or the dollars would not have been made. Given the very large 
returns to corporations derived from campaign donations (Cooper, Gulen, 
& Ovtchinnovkov, 2010), such a huge benefit from influencing government 
policy through election of a desired President could certainly have been 
accrued by interest groups such as the large corporations and business 
trade associations supporting Trump. Trump's proposals to lower business 
taxes and regulation that clearly provided extensive profits to companies 
that far exceeded this amount after his election, the foregoing computations 
and Trump's electoral victory indicates that the dvn resulting from the 
actual $408 million in campaign contributions to him more than offset the 
change in vn caused by Trump's adoption of such policies, so that the net 
dvnBn,Sn>0 from (7).  
The higher political expenditures for the Democratic and Republican 
Parties appear to have been successful in more than offsetting the negative 
b*z,n they took on by representing the special interests of their donors such 
as wealthy individuals and large corporations. In particular, although the 
gross combined campaign expenditures of the Clinton and Trump 
campaigns that consisted of both positive and adversarial marketing of 
each other and their respective policies (but offsetting in their impact on 
their relative unfavorability ratings to the extent of the same level of 
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political spending), that money did provide a benefit to both those two 
candidates in terms of raising their respective vn by November 2016 relative 
to the other political parties with very little financial backing. For instance, 
a June 2016 CNN poll that occurred at the conclusion of the primary 
election campaign indicated 42% for Clinton, 38% for Trump, 9% for Gary 
Johnson, and 7% for Jill Stein (Agiesta, 2016), leaving 4% undecided among 
those 4 candidates. The June advantage itself for those two main party 
candidates likely derived from the branding effect on u*z,n resulting from 
their large political expenditures prior to July 2016. 
The November 2016 vote totals were relatively higher for both Clinton 
and Trump but lower for Johnson and Stein, with the latter two receiving 
only 3.3% and 1.1% of the votes in the final election, respectively (versus 
Clinton's 47.8% and Trump's 46.4%). The change between the November 
vote totals and the June polls imply that the higher campaign spending for 
Trump and Clinton in 2016 largely took votes away from those other two 
“fringe” candidates. In particular, with $2.0 billion more in spending by the 
Republican and Democratic Parties than for the other parties after June 
2016 (OpenSecrets, 2016) included not only the $1.2 billion spent by those 
parties' Presidential candidates but also $0.8 billion expended on 
Congressional and other party marketing that influenced at least some 
voters to cast straight tickets or along straight party lines, a total of $2 
billion/$145=13.8 million votes were changed by the greater spending by 
the two main political parties. This estimated impact of 13.8/136=10.1% of 
the electorate is roughly consistent with the 5.7%+5.9%=11.6% of the share 
lost by Johnson and Stein between the summer and fall of 2016. While the 
extensive political spending by the Republican and Democratic Parties 
appears to have successfully directed voters into perceiving the highest 
utility by making ballot selections based on the choice offered by their two 
nominees for President, the small deviation between model and actual 
results here may possibly be explained by a splitting of the 4% of June 
undecided voters among all 4 candidates. 
 
3.2. Analysis of the fringe candidate polling results 
Polling data on Bernie Sanders, who ran unsuccessfully for the 
Democratic Party nomination in 2016, and who was were very similar to 
Stein on both policy proposals and candidate characteristics, provides 
useful insights on the overall 2016 election results. For example, Sanders as 
well as Stein proposed a higher minimum wage, international trade 
policies to promote employment, government jobs programs, national 
health care, free college education, improved environmental control, and a 
less militaristic foreign policy than other candidates. In addition, both were 
comparable in terms of being relatively unknown to the public prior to 
declaration as a Presidential candidate, not characterized by any adverse 
information about their character or corruption, and personally not very 
wealthy. Stein like Sanders refused to accept corporate campaign 
contributions and so was not perceived to be a handmaiden of corporations 
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and their wealthy owners. Stein's uz,n can therefore be reasonably assumed 
to be the same as that for Sanders.  
These similarities justify using polling numbers for Sanders in the 
Democratic primary as equivalent to those for Stein. For instance, early 
2016 surveys indicated that Sanders was more popular than Trump by an 
average of 8.7% according to the average of seven national polls, versus 
only a 4.6% voter preference for Clinton over Trump (Jacobson, 2016). 
Although Clinton received more funding than did Sanders in the 
Democratic primary elections and eventually beat him in the totals for that 
party's primary, the results in the early campaign suggest that uz,N was -
4.6%-[-8.7%)=4.1% higher for Sanders with respect to the median voter z 
than for Clinton. The uz,N for Sanders among those voters can therefore be 
deduced to be less negative at -6.3%+4.1%=-2.2% overall before the post-
June political expenditures. 
A survey taken after the November 2016 indicated that about 80% and 
12% of the Sanders supporters voted for Clinton and Trump, respectively, 
in the final election (Le Miere, 2017). This finding of few voters favoring 
Sanders casting ballots for Stein is consistent with Clinton's policy 
proposals appealing more to Sanders supporters than Trump's campaign 
platform did and choosing her rather than Stein because of all the 
campaign spending by the Democratic Party, which convinced those voters 
that the common good would be better served by voting for Clinton.9 Thus, 
Clinton's vote share increased 5.9%x0.80=.4.7% due to the switch of Sanders 
supporters to Clinton versus only 5.9%x0.12=0.7% for Trump. 
It is possible to analyze the early higher support for Stein in terms of the 
model's implied vN for her in June (before the post-primary Presidential 
campaign spending by all the candidates) by inserting values for the other 
variables in (4) for the two alternatives to N=Stein with the best chances of 
winning the election. Here, Trump represents candidate x in (4) because he 
had a lower uz,x of -7.0% compared to the alternative m=Clinton, who had a 
uz,n of -6.3% before all her relatively enormous spending in the final 
Presidential election campaign after June 2016. Given the estimated uz,nN=-
2.2% for Stein and assuming that uz,N uz,m, and uz,x were linearly 
proportional to their respective vN, vm, and vx,10 it follows from (4) that 
 
-2.2vN  -  (-7vN) = -6.3vm  – (-7vm), 
vN = 0.146vm 
 
in June 2016. 
With the June 2016 poll indicating that 42% of American voters would 
choose Clinton in the election and thus implying vm=0.42,11 this result 
indicates from (4) that 
 
vN  = (0.42)(0.146) = 0.061 
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for the marginal Stein voter. The 7% polling number for Stein in June 
reported by Agiesta (2016) is the same when 6.1% is rounded up. This 
finding is consistent with the differential campaign spending after June 
affecting the uz,N for Stein mostly through the change in her vN that 
impacted the social utility u*z,N from voting for her as well as through any 
perceived marginal benefit w[vNb*z,N-vNb*z,x] derived from a vote for her 
impacting the election outcome. 
The November results indicating that Clinton had her vote total 
increased by 4.7% from the 4.0% June advantage over Trump versus a rise 
in Trump's vote total of only 0.7% due to the votes of Sanders supporters 
implies that Clinton would have won by 4.0%+4.7%-0.7%=8.0% because of 
this switch. This finding implies that Trump (who lost by only 2% to 
Clinton in November) took 8.0%-2.0%=6.0% of the electorate from those 
supporting Johnson and others (or undecided) in June. Of the 5.7% of the 
electorate who supported Johnson in the early survey defecting in 
November and the further 2.6% of undecided voters in June defecting in 
the actual election (with 1.4% of the 4% of voters undecided among the 4 
leading contenders in June voting for “fifth” party candidates in 
November), Trump apparently took the vast majority, increasing his vote 
share by 6.0%. In particular, the November election results indicate Trump 
took 7.1% of the 5.7%+2.6%=8.3% total switch by the June Johnson 
supporters and undecided voters, versus only 1.2% of those for Clinton.  
The latter result is consistent with Trump's political marketing himself 
with an anti-establishment image (and independent of large corporate 
influences) that may have been decisive for many of the June supporters of 
fringe candidates. Trump having a more pro-business stance than Clinton 
apparently was also important in attracting a far larger share of the 
defectors from Johnson, whose Libertarian Party is pro-business at its core. 
Those two factors would have resulted in the b*z,n (and thus on overall 
voter utility uz,n mostly because of the social impact on u*z,n of [vnb*z,n-
vnb*z,x] regardless of the actually trivial w impact) for Trump among the 
marginal supporters for the Libertarians and others being higher than for 
Clinton in June, thereby enabling him to win more of their votes in 
November despite Clinton higher campaign expenditures after June. 
More campaign spending by Johnson than by Stein, at $13,370.851 
versus $3,713,170 (OpenSecrets.org, 2016), $13,370.831-
$3,713,170=$9,457,681 net, may have contributed to Johnson winning a 
larger share of the vote than Stein by 3.3%-1.1% in the final election count 
in November. For instance, the greater promotional expenditures for 
Johnson than Stein may have made more voters aware of Johnson and his 
policy positions than for Stein. However, given that Johnson's $9,457,681 in 
greater spending would only buy $9,457,681/$145=65,225 more votes at the 
assumed $145 cost per vote, only about 0.1% of the total 136 million votes 
may be concluded to have been cast for Johnson as a result of his campaign 
spending.  
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Thus, it could be deduced that 2.2%-0.1%=2.1% of the higher November 
polling numbers for Johnson versus Stein could be attributed to factors 
unaffected by the differential campaign spending. This percentage is 
almost identical to the 2% greater polling percentage for Johnson compared 
to Stein reported in June 2016 (Agiesta, 2016) that occurred before the 
impact of all the massive political marketingafter the nominating 
conventions.  
The fact that  Johnson's June supporters did not defect at a rate as high 
as for Stein (i.e., he kept 3.3% of 9% of the electorate's vote versus the mere 
1.1% of the 7% Stein had in June) may have stemmed from Libertarians 
having a free enterprise agenda. In particular, such pro-business policies 
had for decades been promoted by wealthy agents to provide more long-
term benefits to voters through greater economic growth and had thereby 
raised the uz,n for politicians advocating for policies favoring business 
interests. Polls indicating that more Sanders supporters actually voted for 
Trump than Stein in the 2016 election (Le Miere, 2017) provides some 
evidence supporting this hypothesis, as Trump's policies were clearly pro-
business despite his image of being anti-establishment which attracted 
some voters who supported the Green Party in June. The large rise over 
time in the number of U.S. business executives becoming U.S. 
Congressional leaders to over 20% by 2014 (Babenko, Fedaseyeu, & Zhang, 
2017) also provides some empirical support for this hypothesis of a long-
term impact of political expenditures, as does the ursuping of the century-
old slogan of “America first” from a progressive dream of a common 
national good with equality for all into a right-wing ideal of nationalist free 
enterprise pushed by politicians like Trump (Churchwell, 2018). 
Propagating the understanding of modern economic theories can certainly 
be used to direct populist sentiment into support for free markets that 
enrich corporations and their wealthy owners (Boyer, 2018). 
The Libertarian party name and policies promoting personal freedom 
from government interference in people's lives may have also resulted in 
Johnson keeping a larger percentage of his June supporters in the 
November election than Stein.11 The Libertarian name alone have created 
an image more appealing to voters protesting against infringements on 
such rights. While the Greens promised personal rights similar to those 
advocated by Johnson, the Libertarian name may have been more 
identified with such freedoms, whereas the Green name could have been 
associated with radical environmental policies which might impinge on 
personal freedoms. Given that many if not most voters had inadequate 
information about the proposed policies of those two parties backed by 
relatively little financing, this latter conjecture seems to be feasible. 
The overall results are consistent the hypothesis that the massive 
amount of political spending, including the negative sorts which portrayed 
the other leading contender in a negative light, was successful in attracting 
attention and votes away from third parties even if it may have had a 
neutralizing impact with respect to taking support from those favoring the 
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main alternative. All such expenditures may have created more social 
bipartisanship among the supporters of the two leading candidates that 
created social pressure on fringe party supporters to choose the lesser of the 
“two evils”. The 2016 results indicate that the Trump campaign was much 
more successful in attracting more defectors from third parties, including 
those whose interests may have been more aligned with the Clinton agenda 
in at least some respects (such as the Libertarians who favored more 
personal freedoms). Trump's success may have related to his marketing 
strategy to promote himself as an outsider representing the white male 
voters in the U.S., and patriots in general, against an elite politician who 
focused on policies of interest to minority interest groups. 
 
 
3.3. Variable estimation error 
Thus, the model can precisely explain the 2016 U.S. Presidential election 
results entirely without invoking any particular news item, revelation, or 
other event. It must be emphasized, however, that all the foregoing 
calculations and deductions are based on estimates of the model variables 
and their distributions. Some of these values derive from average figures 
obtained from surveys as well as from an assumption of a uniform 
distribution for uz,n. Perhaps most important is the use of the value of $145 
estimated in the past to win an additional vote that may have a low degree 
of reliability in many circumstances and across time. 
Older studies by Green & Krasno (1988), and Levitt (1994) with different 
statistical methodologies imply a wide variation in the estimated cost for a 
vote ranging between less than $20 and nearly $400. However, extremes 
across the $20-$400 range seem rather unlikely to be valid for the most 
recent Presidential election. For instance, employing a cost of $20 to buy a 
vote implies that Clinton's higher spending should have won her 
$385million/$20=19.425 million more votes as a result. The fact that she only 
won 2.868 million more votes than Trump despite the higher spending 
would imply that her b*n,j, and hence average uz,n, were substantially lower 
than for Trump prior to the campaign for her as the Democratic 
Presidential nominee. A $20 price for a vote is therefore inconsistent with 
Clinton being 4% more popular than Trump at the time of the June 2016 
poll. In addition a value of $20 to influence a vote implies $2billion/$20=100 
million votes should have been purchased by the two main parties, as 
should have resulted in fewer, if any, ballots being cast for the fringe party 
candidates in November and far less people eligible to vote failing to do so. 
An assumption of $400 being needed to influence a vote also leads to 
questionable results. In particular, such a cost implies that fringe party 
candidates should have received only $2billion/$400=5 million less votes as 
a result of the spending by the main parties that is very far from the actual 
11.6% reduction in the share of the polling numbers for Johnson and Stein 
between June and November (for a discrepancy of 15.8-5.0=10.8 million 
votes less taken from those two fringe party candidates than actually were). 
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Research from a prior gubernatorial election also indicates a much lower 
cost of $107 to win a vote via simple mail and phone bank activities (Cardy, 
2005).  
Thus, the analysis of the 2016 Presidential election here indicates a price 
of $145 per vote is rather accurate in explaining the actual polling results. 
Although this value was originally estimated by Bombardini & Trebbi 
(2011) with data on U.S. Congressional elections using a model restricting 
campaign spending influences to a homogeneous group of uninformed 
voters, the current study here shows it also fits well the data on U.S. 
Presidential elections in 2016.12 
Future research might examine how much this estimated cost of $145 to 
influence a vote varies across elections, including in other countries. It 
might be especially interesting to observe how this price fluctuates over 
time as the model developed here itself might contribute to reducing that 
cost by providing a framework to facilitate political marketing. For 
instance, special interest groups and politicians alike could conduct specific 
surveys to estimate the values of the individual variables in (8) to detect the 
factors which are decisive in affecting voter utility and which might 
therefore be efficiently influenced with the lowest political expenditures. 
Potentially effective marketing strategies with the highest estimated duz,n 
might be implied from such analysis that could then be carried out on small 
scale samples to enable optimizing modifications and expansions of 
successful trials. Such pilot studies to influence voter utility might 
optimally involve integrated multidimensional approaches, which could 
include testing out the effect on the utility of marginal voters in (8) 
associated with changing or refining one or more of a candidate's 
proposals.    
 
4. Conclusion 
This research utilizes a simple mathematical model that incorporates the 
complex interrelationships between political expenditures by special 
interest groups and voter behavior into a small set of categorized variables 
that can enable an improved understanding of the behavior of all political 
participants in election processes. The model demonstrates political 
marketing can most effectively influence election outcomes through the 
social and psychological factors that have a dominant impact on voter 
utility. Special interests and politicians optimally target those maleable 
variables in their political spending to exercise maximum influence on 
voter choices in the process of exercising control over government power. 
An application of the model using public polling information from the 
U.S. 2016 Presidential election supplies evidence on the explanatory power 
of the theory. For instance, the model indicates that most of the campaign 
spending in that election caused voters to switch their support from the 
candidates of fringe political parties and thereby increased the ballot totals 
of the Democratic and Republican nominees. This research thus indicates 
the overwhelming power of special interests endowed with substantial 
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financial resources to determine election outcomes despite the high cost of 
swaying a vote in contemporary times. It thereby supplies insights that 




1. Prior empirical studies, such as by Ansolabehere, Figueiredo, & Snyder (2003), Cooper, 
Gulen, & Ovtchinnovkov (2010), and Hill, Kelly, Lockhart, & Van Ness (2013), have found 
that the average return on political capital invested through corporate campaign donations 
is abnormally high. Addoum, Delikouras, Ke, & Kumar (2018) have shown empirically 
that the election of politicians more favorable (unfavorable) to firms' operations have 
persisting long-term impacts on the positive (negative) returns to their stocks. Although 
Aggarwal, Meschke, & Wang (2012) have found some evidence of the political soft money 
donations of corporations (that were allowed prior to 2003) to be negatively related to be 
associated with negative stock returns over the next year, that research did not evaluate 
the long-term impact of such political expenditures, which were unrelated to actual 
lobbying activities and direct contributions to individual candidates and which may 
therefore have had an effect on politicians, elections, and government actions only over 
longer periods of time because the influence was more indirect and gradual.  
2. This result was initially shown by Murphy (2019). Politicians cater to the wishes of agents 
making campaign contributions to them because the costs of non-compliance can be 
prohibitive, as is often assumed in many political models of the impact of campaign 
contributions (Baron, 1994). For instance, the real but potentially unstated threat of donors 
associated with discontinuing political expenditures for a non-compliant politician, as well 
as the risk of agents making donations to political opponents of the uncooperative 
politician who fails to support the policies of donors, is instrumental in enabling moneyed 
interests to influence government policy (Chamon & Kaplan, 2013). Billionaire investors in 
political campaigns have openly admitted that “we expect a return on our investment” 
(Cathcart, 2016), and that a “political consequence for opposition and a political reward for 
support” exists with respect to campaign contributions to politicians (Scheiber, 2017).  
3. Politicians benefit in numerous ways from being elected, such as the power, fame, and 
self-satisfaction generated from winning an election, as well as from the valuable 
compensation paid by the government for their service in office and having the power to 
promote their personal views. Politicians may also gain valuable benefits after leaving 
office through the “revolving door” to companies and special interest groups obtained 
through lucrative employment and contract opportunities after compliant government 
service to their donors (Economist, 2017a). 
4. The dollar cost of foregoing an hour of paid work is higher for those with higher income 
(Faravelli, Kalavci, & Pimienta, 2017), but the marginal utility of an extra unit of time or 
expense generated through just registering and voting may be greater for lower-income 
individuals because a single dollar is more valuable to the less affluent (given declining 
marginal utility of wealth and free time).  
5. Strategic voting is motivated almost universally because the number of elected 
government representatives is invariably less than the number of voters, so that voter 
utility is decreased by choosing candidates or parties unsure to exceed the hurdle 
minimum. Strategic voting is more important in pluralities or in countries that have a 
minimum number or percentage of votes for a political party or candidate to be 
represented in government (as is common in many nations' rules for elections to 
parliament that often have a threshold like 5% of the vote total to be represented in 
government as well as exists whenever some number of votes is required to have any 
representation whatsoever).  
6. Brennan & Buchanan (1984) long ago showed mathematically the extremely small chance 
that an individual's vote will have on the election outcome. Shayo & Harel (2012) have 
indicated that probability to be one in sixty million in U.S. Presidential elections. Although 
Faravelli, Kalavci, & Pimienta (2017) have indicated people tend to overestimate the 
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importance of their votes, the very small objective estimate for w shown here makes it 
unlikely that w[vn{db*z,n-db*z,x}+dvn{b*z,n-b*z,x}] would exceed even a tiny Cz. The existence 
of elections for multiple candidates (as well as for ballot referendum issues) can 
potentially increase the summed benefits from going to the polls by making several 
strategic voting choices at once (Coate & Conlin, 2004), but it is unlikely that even a 
modest value for Cz would be exceeded in any event, especially since voter turnout is 
much lower in the U.S. for elections not related to casting a ballot for President.  
7. Faravelli, Kalavci, & Pimienta (2017) have found that voters generate positive utility from 
casting a ballot for the winning candidate or party, as is consistent with social pressure to 
serve the common good as measured by the choices of other voters. 
8. Trump became the President despite not receiving as many popular votes as Clinton did 
nationwide because he garnered more of the U.S. system's electoral college votes, which 
each of the 50 U.S. states generally allocates as a unified set on a winner-take-all basis 
determined by the popular vote within each state. Trump's electoral victory therefore was 
partially related to more judicious use of money expended by his campaign to strategically 
win the votes in the states with narrow margins of victory using improvements in the 
concentrated voter targeting tactics of political expenditures described by Huber & 
Arceneuaux (2007). 
9. Sanders' endorsement of Clinton after he had lost the Democratic nomination (Hill, 
Merica, & Zelaney, 2016) may have been very useful for Clinton's spending to persuade 
his supporters to vote for her after the June 2016 poll. Although a 2016 survey by states 
indicated that Sanders would also have won the electoral college with 311 votes in a direct 
electoral competition against Trump (270ToWin, 2017b), Bernie's inability to win the 
Democratic nomination was certainly a factor in his decision to promote a strategic vote 
for Clinton in a failed effort to defeat Trump. 
10. A linear proportionality follows from the impact of [vnb*z,n-vnb*z,x] on u*z,n, as well as from 
the w[vnb*z,n-vnb*z,x] term, in (4). The equating of vn with the actual polling numbers here 
(for June 2016) prior to all the campaign spending and media coverage seems reasonable 
given that the value of this variable in (4) and (8) represents each voter's estimate that may 
be based on very little information or analysis. While voters might estimate candidate 
popularity from information on the opinions of just a few others (Fisher & Myatt, 2016), 
Myersen & Weber (1993) have indicated how the media can manipulate voting results 
simply through their reporting of survey results. Although Fey (1997) has shown where 
polls can be useful to voters in coordinating strategic casting of ballots to defeat a least 
desired candidate, that researcher recognized that media coverage and surveys themselves 
could be manipulated to attain an outcome which is desired by those financing firms 
involved in public dissemination of information and pre-elections polls. Even if there is an 
incentive to provide programming to attract a larger audience and thereby maximize 
advertising and subscription revenues (Dyck,  Moss, & Zingales, 2013), the media is also 
motivated to serve the special interests of the wealthy owners (Herman & Chomsky, 2006), 
who were best served by focusing attention away from their least favorite candidate.  
11. Clinton's failure to take more of this voter sentiment favoring more personal freedoms 
might have have resulted from her emphasis on her catering to special “identity” groups 
with entrenched voter opinions unlikely to positively change the uz,n of the marginal voter.  
12. It is also similar to the $150 average marketing cost for a traditional bank to win a new 
customer, although that price is substantially lower for new financial tech banks (Kutler, 
2019). The price per vote could be lower for revolutionary political parties and candidates 
without a long promoted brand name, relatively less promoted currently, and thus not 
widely known. On the other hand, the impact of a low vN in (4) can greatly reduce u*z,N 
due to social perceptions that ballots cast for third parties in the U.S. are wasted, and so 
the cost per vote won for fringe candidates might actually be higher until some greater 
level of vN were reached. Evidence of such an effect was discovered by Green & Krasno 
(1988), who found that the marginal cost of buying additional votes was higher at very 
high levels of expenditures but was larger at very low levels of political spending. The 
latter empirical findings are consistent with u*z,n being a function of vn despite the 
insignificance of w in impacting uz,n in (4).  
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13. For instance, applying the model to primary elections such as exist for the Democratic and 
Republican Parties in the U.S., fringe candidates without personal brand name appeal or 
the backing of wealthy special interests would seem to have the same disadvantages in 
attracting support, small donor funding, and votes as the nominees of fringe parties 
according to (4). As a result, wealthy agents may therefore be able to utilize their greater 
financial resources to focus public attention on candidates representing their special 
interests, thereby leading to social pressure to choose only from those politicians who are 
supported by agents with sufficient funding to compete in buying attention and votes 
through their marketing expenditures. The model might be useful in evaluating the 
feasibility of an electoral victory for one of the candidates for the Democratic Presidential 
nominee advocating for the Green New Deal, which involves large spending to avoid the 
huge costs of pollution as well as provide Medicare for all and a universal income that 
may be economically efficient if it could be financed (Dsouza, 2019). While drastically 
reducing military spending might be sufficient to fund program, doing so would motivate 
armaments producers to add to the already massive potential for enormous political 
expenditures by other wealthy agents (like dirty energy firms and health insurance 
companies) to engage in whatever marketing is necessary to prevent actual government 
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